Difference between revisions of "Invited Talks - Joint School 2014"

From prosecco
(Type-Based Verification of Electronic Voting Protocols (Véronique Cortier, CNRS & LORIA Nancy))
(Matteo's abstract)
 
(One intermediate revision by the same user not shown)
Line 5: Line 5:
 
We further develop a code-based cryptographic abstraction of the cryptographic primitives commonly used in e-voting protocols, showing how to make the underlying algebraic properties accessible to automated verification through logical refinements. Finally, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach by developing the first automated analysis of Helios, a popular web-based e-voting protocol, using an off-the-shelf type-checker.
 
We further develop a code-based cryptographic abstraction of the cryptographic primitives commonly used in e-voting protocols, showing how to make the underlying algebraic properties accessible to automated verification through logical refinements. Finally, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach by developing the first automated analysis of Helios, a popular web-based e-voting protocol, using an off-the-shelf type-checker.
 
'''[https://wiki.inria.fr/wikis/prosecco/images/5/52/Veronique-school2014.pdf Slides]'''
 
'''[https://wiki.inria.fr/wikis/prosecco/images/5/52/Veronique-school2014.pdf Slides]'''
 +
 +
= [https://wiki.inria.fr/wikis/prosecco/images/1/19/Slides-matteo.pdf Logical Foundations of Secure Resource Management in Protocol Implementations] ([https://www.sps.cs.uni-saarland.de/maffei/ Matteo Maffei], Saarland University) =
 +
Recent research has shown that it is possible to leverage
 +
general-purpose theorem proving techniques to develop powerful
 +
type systems for the verification of a wide range of security
 +
properties on application code. Although successful in many
 +
respects, these type systems fall short of capturing
 +
resource-conscious properties that are crucial in large classes
 +
of modern distributed applications. In this talk, I will present
 +
a type system that statically enforces the safety of
 +
cryptographic protocol implementations with respect to
 +
authorization policies expressed in affine logic. Our type system
 +
draws on a novel notion of "exponential serialization" of affine
 +
formulas, a general technique to protect affine formulas from the
 +
effect of duplication. This technique allows for an expressive
 +
logical encoding of the authentication mechanisms underpinning
 +
distributed resource-aware authorization policies.
 +
'''[https://wiki.inria.fr/wikis/prosecco/images/1/19/Slides-matteo.pdf Slides]'''

Latest revision as of 15:04, 13 December 2014

Type-Based Verification of Electronic Voting Protocols (Véronique Cortier, CNRS & LORIA Nancy)

E-voting protocols aim at achieving a wide range of sophisticated security properties and, consequently, commonly employ advanced cryptographic primitives. This makes their design as well as rigorous analysis quite challenging. As a matter of fact, existing automated analysis techniques, which are mostly based on automated theorem provers, are inadequate to deal with commonly used cryptographic primitives, such as homomorphic encryption and mix-nets, as well as some fundamental security properties, such as verifiability. This work presents a novel approach based on refinement type systems for the automated analysis of e-voting protocols. Specifically, we design a generically applicable logical theory which, based on pre- and post-conditions for security critical code, captures and guides the type-checker towards the verification of two fundamental properties of e-voting protocols, namely, vote privacy and verifiability. We further develop a code-based cryptographic abstraction of the cryptographic primitives commonly used in e-voting protocols, showing how to make the underlying algebraic properties accessible to automated verification through logical refinements. Finally, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach by developing the first automated analysis of Helios, a popular web-based e-voting protocol, using an off-the-shelf type-checker. Slides

Logical Foundations of Secure Resource Management in Protocol Implementations (Matteo Maffei, Saarland University)

Recent research has shown that it is possible to leverage general-purpose theorem proving techniques to develop powerful type systems for the verification of a wide range of security properties on application code. Although successful in many respects, these type systems fall short of capturing resource-conscious properties that are crucial in large classes of modern distributed applications. In this talk, I will present a type system that statically enforces the safety of cryptographic protocol implementations with respect to authorization policies expressed in affine logic. Our type system draws on a novel notion of "exponential serialization" of affine formulas, a general technique to protect affine formulas from the effect of duplication. This technique allows for an expressive logical encoding of the authentication mechanisms underpinning distributed resource-aware authorization policies. Slides