

PROVING PROGRAMS CORRECT WITH 

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Joint work with LOTS of people

No shortage of security vulnerabilities in low-level code



Fix: Move to higher level languages ...



No more buffer overruns ... yay!

But, is your program secure? Depends ...



Higher abstractions

➔ Improved productivity and fewer bugs

CORRECT? SECURE?

Your high-speed trading software isn't blowing away billions!

- NASDAQ bugs (Aug 22, 2013), DOW Flash Crash (May 6, 2010), ...

Your SSH/TLS library is heartbleed-free, but is it secure?

- TLS renegotiation → man in the middle; No NSA backdoors?

Your national health insurance market place does not crash!


OUR GOAL

TO BUILD AND DEPLOY SYSTEMS THAT ARE PROVABLY SECURE, END-TO-END

AN END-TO-END PROGRAM VERIFICATION AGENDA

1. Precisely state application-specific correctness and security criteria
2. Use high-level programming language tools to implement software that can be formally verified to comply with its specification
3. Generate and deploy low-level code that is also proven to meet the same specification.

Many research projects on program verification,
for Pascal-like languages



Spec#



Boogie



VeriFast



Z3



ERGO

Vampire

Simplify

CVC4



But, modern languages are not like Pascal! (pervasively higher-order)

Lambdas everywhere!



Delegates, lambdas, LINQ, RX, ...


```
delegate B Func<A,B>(A arg)
foreach (var i in L) {...}
```



JavaScript: AJAX, Event handlers, jQuery, DOM,...

```
Element.addEventListener(ev, function(node){...})
$('li').each(function(index) { .. })
```

HIGHER-ORDER VERIFIERS ~ INTERACTIVE PROOF ASSISTANTS



Agda



NuPRL ...

Very expressive logics! :-)

Impoverished programming languages
Pure total functions only :-)

Enter F* ...

<http://research.microsoft.com/fstar>



An ML-like language designed for program verification

Since around 2008, many people have worked on it:

Currently: Bhargavan, Delignat-Lavaud, Fournet, Hritcu, Keller, Rastogi, Strub, Swamy

Previously: Borgstrom, Chugh, Dagand, Fredrikson, Guha, Yang, Jeannin, Schlesinger, Weinberger

```
val f: x:int -> y:int{y > x}
let f x = x + 1
```

**Term syntax is core-ML,
resembling F#/Caml-light**

```
val sort: f:(a -> a -> Tot bool){total_order a f}
         -> l:list a
         -> Tot (m:list a{sorted m /\ forall x. mem x m = mem x l})
```

```
let rec sort f = function
```

**Types allows expressing precise,
functional-correctness properties**

```
| [] -> []
```

```
| hd::tl -> let hi, lo = partition (f hd) tl in sort lo@(hd::sort hi)
```


```
val counter: unit -> ST (x:int{x >= 0})
```

```
let counter =
```

```
  let c = ref 0 in
```

```
  fun () -> c := !c + 1; !c
```

Program with state and other effects



Brief history of an evolving line of languages ...



An outline of the remainder of this talk:

A quick introduction to refinement types, by example

A brief mention of some of our past work

F* version 1.0: An outline of the concepts you will learn over the next 2 days

WEB-BROWSER SECURITY

(IEEE S&P (OAKLAND) 2011)

Extensions :: Add-ons for Firefox

able to download from. We have integrated a flash video player too, so that you can play your files immediately.

AniWeather
by AniWeather

AniWeather = Animated Weather + Any Weather.

When it rains, it really does!

+ Add to Firefox
Featured
★★★★★ 369 reviews
108,888 weekly downloads

Stylish
by Jason Barnabe

Restyle the web with Stylish, a user styles manager. Stylish lets you easily install themes and skins for Google, Facebook, YouTube, Orkut and many, many other sites. You can even customize Firefox and other programs themselves.

Support this add-on: [Contribute \\$5.00](#)

+ Add to Firefox
Featured
★★★★★ 436 reviews
107,253 weekly downloads

Web of Trust - Safe Browsing Tool
by WOT Services

Would you like to know which websites you can trust? The Web of Trust (WOT) add-on is a safe surfing tool for your browser. Traffic-light rating symbols show which websites you can trust when you search, shop and surf on the Web.

Support this add-on: [Contribute \\$10.00](#)

FoxTab
by The FoxTab Team

3D in your browser! FoxTab brings innovative 3D functionality to your Firefox.

+ Add to Firefox
Featured
★★★★★ 1,107 reviews
103,510 weekly downloads

1. 1/3rd of Firefox users run extensions (~34 million users)
2. Popular Chrome extensions have thousands of users

mailto:joe@cs.brown.edu

Change mailto

Change links to evil.com?

https://mail.google.com/mail/?view=cm&tf=1&to=joe@cs.brown.edu&cc=&su=&body=&fs=1



Send my email to evil.com?

Send selected word to Google

chaise: A horse-drawn carriage for one or two people, typically one with an open top and two wheels


As some of you may know, Edinburgh is a little bit different. A significant corner when, after the

[More »](#)

ACCESS CONTROL IN CHROME

1. Sensitive APIs


```
"permissions": [  
  "tabs",  
  "http://www.twitter.com/*",  
  ...  
]
```



Extension runs on these URLs


POLICY ANALYSIS

ACCESSIBLE URLS



POLICY ANALYSIS

ACCESS TO HISTORY



1,137 extension policies



Rewrite mailto: links on *all* sites

```
"permissions": [
  "http://*/*"
]
```

the gods and gave up.

desired, least-privilege security policy is *inexpressible*

too. In addition, while on sabbatical there, the apal
in also routinely had poor connections, while the co
her.
chaise: A horse-drawn carriage for one
or two people, typically one with an open
top and two wheels
and is a
know, Ec

Sends selected word to Google from *any* website

```
"permissions": [
  "http://*/*"
]
```

daily post-chaise to London. I am beginning to se
service still runs, and the city's IP packets are carri
pumped into the electronic network when they arriv
might explain why Edinburgh has so many theoretic
systems people: out of pure necessity, rather like th
did theory back in the days when they couldn't affor

Anyway, I am back in the land of the free connectio
brave IP packets, so all should be well henceforth.
week as I catch up on a few hundred messages.)

Fine-grained
extension policy

Extension source

Developers


- Write extension policy along with their code
- Use tools to ensure extension conforms to policy

App store and users

- Uses tools to ensure extension conforms to policy
- Host and install approved extensions

EXAMPLE:

ONLY READ TEXT IN <HEAD>



Secure DOM API

```
type elt

assume val getInnerText :
  e:elt { canRead e }
  -> string

assume val tagName :
  e:elt
  -> string
```

Native DOM elements, abstract to F*, API implemented by browser

A refinement type:

Only those elts e for which canRead e = true

Policy

F* checks pre- and post-conditions *statically*.
No need for manual code audit; only policy review

```
tagName e = head || hasAttribute e public || ...
```

ONLY READ TEXT IN <HEAD>, OR NODES TAGGED "PUBLIC"

Code

```
let safeRead e =
  if canRead e = "head"
  then getInnerText e
  else "not allowed"
```

UNTRUSTED CLIENT CODE:

VERIFIED BY F* TO MAKE SURE THAT DOM API FUNCTIONS
ARE NEVER ACCESSED EXCEPT AS ALLOWED BY THE POLICY

Some more examples of refinement types:

```
val factorial: x:int{x >= 0} -> y:int{y >= 1}
```

```
val append: l1:list 'a -> l2:list 'a -> l3:list 'a {length l3 = length l1 + length l2}
```

```
val mac: k:key -> t:text{key_property k t} -> tag
```

```
val verify: k:key -> t:text -> m:tag -> b:bool{ b ==> key_property k t}
```

...

Extension Name	Access control using refinement types
Gmail checker	Rewrites “mailto:” links to open Gmail compose page
Dictionary lookup	Queries online dictionary with selection; displays definition in a popup
PrintNewYorker	Rewrites internal links to go directly to print view
Bookmarking	Sends selection to delicious.com
Google Reader client	Sends RSS feed links to Google Reader
Facebook miner	Sends friends’ Web addresses to delicious.com
JavaScript toolbox	Edits selected text
Password manager	Stores and retrieves passwords on each page
Magnify under mouse	Modifies the CSS on the page
Short URL expander	Sends URLs to longurlplease.com
Typography	Modifies <input> elements

Fine-grained
extension policy

Extension source

Write and verify F* code

Compile it to JavaScript and deploy in browser

But, how do you know that the code
running in the browser behaves
exactly like the verified source code?

So, we used F*'s type system to prove that a compiler
from F* to JavaScript is *fully abstract* (popl '13)

- The compiler precisely captures all source properties,
even when a compiled F* program is composed with
arbitrary JavaScript

Refinement types, when combined with other F* features,
can be used to prove highly non-trivial properties

F* verifier
& compiler



Refinement types, when combined with other F* features,
can be used to prove highly non-trivial properties

- Security of an implementation of the TLS 1.2 standard (Cedric and Antoine, tomorrow)
- Self-certification: Proving the correctness of the F* type-checker itself using F*, and bootstrapping it in Coq (brief mention tomorrow)
- Proving the safety of an embedded, security-oriented sublanguage of TypeScript, a JavaScript dialect
- Probabilistic relational Hoare logic, i.e., a logic similar to EasyCrypt's, encoded in F*'s type checker and used to prove several small crypto constructions
- ...

F* v1.0: Refinements and beyond

- A new version, based on a fresh code base
- Consolidating, then significantly improving, many of our prior efforts
- Written entirely in F* itself, bootstraps to multiple platforms
 - Caml done, almost. F# and JavaScript on the way!
- Why a new version?
 - Partly motivated by wanting to build a new, high-efficiency, certified implementation of TLS

F* v1.0: Refinements and beyond

But, it's still under heavy development:

Completing and polishing the implementation:

- Code generations to multiple backends
- Error reporting
- Test, test, test! Then test some more.

And with more research:

- Formal certification of the implementation
- Formally certified proofs from an SMT solver

F* v1.0: Refinements and beyond


A sampling of new features that you will see in the next couple of days ...

A logic including total, recursively defined higher-order functions

Here's what F* infers for the type of max:

A *total* function from two integers to an integer

```
val max : int -> int -> Tot int  
let max i j = if i > j then i else j
```



Tot: this is an *effect* label, meaning that max is a total function.

Allows you to rely on *computation* to state and prove specifications

```
assert (map (fun x -> x + 1) [0;1;2] = [1;2;3])
```

Extrinsic and intrinsic proofs

An intrinsic refinement of the ML type of reverse

```
val reverse: l:list 'a -> Tot (m:list 'a{length m = length l})
let reverse l = match l with
| [] -> []
| hd::tl -> reverse tl @[hd]
```

```
val reverse_involutive: l:list 'a -> Lemma (reverse (reverse l) = l)
```

An "after the fact" (aka extrinsic) proof about reverse

Semantic proofs of program termination

```
val ackermann: m:int{m>=0} -> n:int{n>=0} -> Tot (a:int{a>=0})
let ackermann m n =
  if m=0 then n+1
  else if n=0 then ackermann (m - 1) 1
  else ackermann (m - 1) (ackermann m (n - 1))
```

Other effects

A function that may read or write the heap, or diverge, when called, returning a stateful function itself

```
val counter: unit -> ST (unit -> ST int)
let counter () =
  let c = ST.alloc 0 in
  fun () -> c := c + 1; !c
```

ST: this is an *effect* label, meaning that counter may have state effects or diverge

Plus, a customizable lattice of user-defined effects

Type inference with indexed effects / verification condition generation

```
val swap: x:ref 'a  
  -> y:ref 'a  
  -> ST unit  
    (requires (fun h -> contains h x && contains h y))  
    (ensures (fun hold _ hnew ->  
              hnew=(hold[x] <- hold[y])[y] <- hold[x]))  
    (modifies {x,y}))  
let swap x y = let tmp = x in x := !y; y := tmp
```

Plan for today

- Tutorial 1: F* basics.
 - Simple stateless access control
 - Functions on integers and basic refinement types and lemmas
 - Functions on lists and lemmas
- Tutorial 2: More F* basics
 - Proving termination
 - A full example: A verified implementation of quicksort

Plan for tomorrow

- Lecture 1: Advanced F*, higher-kinds, state, and other effects
 - Stateful access control
 - Hiding local state
- Lecture 2: Attacks on TLS and a verified implementation in F7
- Tutorial 1: Type-based cryptography in F*
- Tutorial 2: Programming language metatheory in F*
 - Syntactic type soundness for the simply typed lambda calculus